Manipulation via information in large elections by Sezer, İlhan
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MANIPULATION VIA INFORMATION IN LARGE ELECTIONS 
 
 
 
 
A Master’s Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
İLHAN SEZER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
Bilkent University 
Ankara 
 
January 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MANIPULATION VIA INFORMATION IN LARGE ELECTIONS 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
of 
Bilkent University 
 
 
by 
 
 
İLHAN SEZER 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfilment of  the Requirements for the Degree  
of 
MASTER OF ARTS  
 
in 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
January 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and 
in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Economics. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Prof. Semih Koray  
Supervisor 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and 
in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Economics. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Asst. Prof. Tarık Kara 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and 
in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Economics. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Asst. Prof. Emre Berk 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Prof. Kürşat Aydoğan 
Director 
 
 iii
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
MANIPULATION VIA INFORMATION IN LARGE ELECTIONS 
 
 
Sezer, İlhan 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray 
 
January 2006 
 
 
 This thesis studies manipulations of equilibria by candidates in two-alternative 
elections along with their effects on voter turnout, winner of the election and social 
welfare where voters have common values, and both voting and manipulating are costly. 
We show that manipulation is not desirable for the society, and the candidates’ incentives 
for manipulating can be mitigated by appropriately sequencing the order of 
manipulations. We present some results of a manipulation game which may rather 
unexpected under the assumption that the candidates have prior beliefs about each others’ 
manipulations. Finally we determine the set of manipulations which can be prevented by 
informed voters for a given composition of society. 
 
Keywords: Voting, Manipulation, Social Welfare, Voter Turnout, Trust Ratio                     
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ÖZET 
 
SEÇMEN SAYISI BÜYÜK SEÇİMLERDE BİLGİ ÜZERİNDEN MANİPÜLASYON 
 
 
Sezer, İlhan 
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray 
 
Ocak 2006 
 
 
Bu çalışmamızda oy kullanma ve manipülasyon yapmanın maliyetli olduğu, ortak değerli 
iki alternatifli seçimler çerçevesinde adayların denge manipülasyonlarını, bunların oy 
kullanma oranı, seçimi, galibi ve toplumsal refah üstündeki etkileriyle birlikte inceledik. 
Manipülasyonun toplum için istenilir olmadığını ve adayları manipülasyona özendiren 
etkenlerin uygun bir manipülasyon yapma sıralaması ile yumuşatılabileceğini  gösterdik. 
Adayların birbirlerinin manipülasyonları hakkında önsel bir sanıya sahip oldukları 
varsayımı altında oynanan bir manipülasyon oyununun şaşırtıcı olabilecek bazı 
sonuçlarına  ulaştık. Son olarak verilmiş bir toplum bileşimi için bu konuda bilgi sahibi 
seçmenler tarafından önlenebilecek manipülasyon  kümesini belirledik. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Oy kullanma, Manipülasyon, Toplumsal Refah, Seçmen Katılımı, 
İtimat Oranı 
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 CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Elections have become an important part of our life in democratic societies.  In our 
modern world election is the most frequently used mechanism by which the offices in the 
executive, judiciary, regional or local government are filled. Elections are also held in 
many other settings, ranging from clubs and societies to business. The idea which results 
this situation is that the person who is supported by the majority should be the executive, 
and elections are held for determining this person. There are two sides in each election, 
the candidates and the voters. It is the interaction between these two sides, which 
determines the outcome of an election. On one side, the candidates try to influence 
voters’ preferences along with their decisions to participate in the elections. They do this 
by giving information about their future plans or relevant properties of themselves or 
their parties, where this information need not be true. On the other side, the voters do 
affect the candidates: lots through the voters they cast or by simply not casting any vote 
at all. So the underlying reasons for a voter to support a candidate and cast a vote in his 
favor, as well as the possible efforts of the candidates to influence the results of an 
election should be researched, aiming to reach socially desirable results in the elections. 
 1
There have been many studies concerning these issues from various aspects. In this study 
we will focus on the effects of possible manipulations on the past of the candidates. 
However, such an analysis cannot be done without analyzing voters’ behavior. In the 
present setup, we refer to Taylor and Yildirim (2005), who consider voting in two 
alternative elections with common value. They present a theory of strategic voting, and 
figure out the effects of relevant information on voters’ behaviors. In their setting, the 
relevant information is restricted to the distribution of political preferences, and they 
regard voting to be costly. A voter casts a vote for his preferred candidate only if the 
effect of his vote, which is proportional to the probability of his vote being the decisive 
vote, is not less than the cost of voting for him. In our study, we analyze candidate’s 
behavior, while regarding how voters behave in this setting we borrow the results of 
Taylor and Yildirim (2005).  
 
In the light of Taylor and Yildirim (2005), we consider in our study two different 
cases. In the first case of informed voters, the voters are assumed to be informed about 
the distribution of political preferences. The second case is that of uninformed voters, 
where the voters are assumed to be symmetrically ignorant about the distribution of 
types. The voters are not aware of the manipulations in either of the settings. In the first 
case if the candidates manipulate simultaneously, then cooperation among the candidates 
is impossible. We try to predict what manipulations will take place along with the result 
of the election, when the candidates have a prior belief about each others’ manipulation. 
On the other hand when the candidates manipulate sequentially, there are equilibria in 
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which the order influences the cost of the election both the candidates and the society.  In 
the second setting, there turns out to be a positive probability that one of the candidates 
wins without manipulation whatever the other candidate does. Whenever this is the case, 
cooperation is obviously possible, but otherwise cooperation is again impossible. Using a 
setup where candidates have prior beliefs about each others’ manipulations, we get some 
unexpected results: A candidate who has the support of a majority may lose the election. 
When the candidates manipulate sequentially, we again determine the effect of 
sequencing on the cost and the winner.  We examine what properties a society, which can 
undo the effects of manipulations is endowed with, under the assumption that the people 
who are not manipulated know the exact number of manipulated voters. We observe that 
the society can prevent some manipulations, while manipulation is always possible as 
long as the society is large and there are manipulable voters manipulation is always 
possible. 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter, we survey the 
literature on voting concerned with turnout, manipulation and social welfare. In chapter 
3, the framework and findings of Taylor and Yildirim (2005) are summarized. Chapter 4 
deals with manipulation via information on the part of candidates along with its welfare 
implications. Chapter 5 concludes our study. 
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 CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
Voting and manipulation are important in democracy and have been studied in 
many papers. A significant observation about democratic political process is that only a 
fraction of eligible voters turn out to vote, which gives rise to an important question: 
“Why do some voters not vote?”. To answer this question we have to accept that voting is 
costly for the voters, for otherwise they would vote for certain as this would increase the 
probability of victory of the candidate they support. When voting has a positive cost, the 
fraction of the electorate participating in an election will depend on the magnitude of 
cost, and this will of course have an impact upon welfare of the society. In the voting 
literature, the works of Ledyard (1981), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) are important 
for understanding the theory of participation, While Ledyard (1984), Borgers (2004) and 
Campbell (1999) can be consulted regarding the welfare aspect. 
 
Ledyard (1981) models simultaneous voting. In his model, the citizens have rational 
expectations about the probability of being decisive; they know the size of the electorate 
and their own preferences. The probability distribution from which the other voters’ 
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preferences are drawn is assumed to be common knowledge. The major result of this 
paper is that turnout is positive, when the cost of voting is very small for some of the 
citizens, when compared with their valuation for their candidates’ victory. Ledyard’s 
conclusions about turnout are rather limited. But Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) obtain a 
richer variety of conclusions using a similar approach. They consider a costly voting 
game-theoretic model under complete information. They focus on the voter turnouts at 
some equilibria of the voting game which they characterize in their study. Their 
predictions about the size of voter turnout are rather weak for small numbers of voters, 
but for large electorates they conclude that the percentage of voter turnout approaches 
zero or the turnout percentage of the majority side is smaller than that of the minority 
side. In their 1985 paper, the citizens are assumed to be privately informed about their 
own cost of voting, and it is shown that this leads to a unique equilibrium at which only 
citizens with costs below an endogenous threshold vote.  
 
Ledyard (1984) develops a Bayesian model of a two candidate competition to deal 
with the game theoretic considerations on the part of the voter. In his model the voters 
vote deterministically, they can vote for one of the candidates or abstain. The cost of 
voting is a random variable. His major result is that, in large elections, if voting costs are 
non-negative there is an equilibrium at which the social welfare is optimal. At this 
equilibrium the candidates choose identical positions which maximize welfare, and at 
which no one votes. But Ledyard (1984) does not study the possibility of multiple 
equilibria. Campbell (1999) studies a model in which the voters in the minority group 
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possess stronger political preferences (lower costs) than the ones in the majority. He finds 
that when the number of voters tends to infinity, the minority group wins the election 
with a probability which is at least
2
1 . This result may seem a bit unexpected but it is 
supported by other recent papers on this issue. Borgers (2004) investigates an informed 
voter setting in which it is common knowledge that each citizen is equally likely to 
support either candidate. He proves the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium 
when preferences are independent, and shows that equilibrium turnout may be excessive, 
which in term means that these equilibria are suboptimal. 
 
Goeree and Grosser (2004), Taylor and Yildirim (2005) are two recent studies, 
which are closely related to the present study of ours. Goeree and Grosser (2004) present 
a simple two candidate voting model to answer the following question: “Why do the polls 
predict the wrong outcome?”  Their results support the intuition that after releasing the 
results of the pre-election polls, the members of the minority group participate in the 
election more frequently to offset the advantage of the majority group. They also find that 
polls raise the expected turnout but reduce the expected welfare by increasing the effect 
of the minority group, because the election leads to in a tie in terms of expected values. 
Their results support Campbell (1999) too. Taylor and Yildirim (2005) consider the 
impact of public information on expected turnout and electoral outcomes. They present a 
strategic voting model with two candidates, which predicts the probability of victory for 
the majority group to be less than that for the minority group (democratic inefficiency), 
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and voter turnout turns out to be higher (economic inefficiency) when citizens possess 
more information about the composition of the electorate. Thus social welfare is higher 
when the citizens possess less information. A fine point of their model is that it can easily 
be extended to deal with other issues.  
 
There is also a recent empirical study of Levine and Palfrey (2005) on voter 
participation. They test three voter turnout predictions of the rational choice Palfrey-
Rosenthal model of participation with asymmetric information: turnout goes down in 
larger electorates (size effect), turnout is higher in elections in which the votes the 
candidates receive are expected to be close (competition effect), voters supporting the 
less popular alternative have higher turnout rates (underdog effect). 
 
Taylor and Yildirim (2005) concerns the effect of information on voters’ behaviors. 
Here we continue this story by examining how the candidates can use the effect of 
information, by manipulating the knowledge of voters.  Thus another important notion, 
manipulation, is included into our study. Gibbard (1973) proves that any non-dictatorial 
voting scheme with at least three possible outcomes is subject to individual manipulation. 
Following Gibbard (1973), there are some papers which compare the vulnerability of 
different election methods, exemplified by Lepelley and Mbih (1994), Dummett (1998) 
and Favardin, Lepelley and Serais (2002). Some papers study the complexity of 
manipulating existing protocols, as Conitzer and Sandholm (2002), Conitzer, Lang and 
Sandholm (2003); Finally, papers as Franzese (1999) and Drazen and Eslava (2005)  
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study the effects of manipulations in different models and some other studies the effects 
of manipulations in different models.  
 
Lepelley and Mbih (1994) define vulnerability of a social choice function to 
coalitional manipulation of preferences as the proportion of voting situations in which the 
social choice function can be manipulated by a coalition of individuals. They provide 
exact relations yielding the vulnerability of four specific social choice functions (plurality 
rule, anti-plurality rule, plurality with runoff, anti-plurality with runoff) in three-
alternative elections and show that plurality with runoff is less vulnerable than the others. 
Dummett (1998) draws attention to the objection that Borda count is subject to agenda 
manipulation and describes two possible ways for fixing it by introducing revised and 
adjusted Borda scores. He shows that these will often, but not always, undo the agenda 
manipulation effect, and questions whether it is desirable at all to undo it altogether. 
Favardin, Lepelley and Serais (2002) characterize the voting situations at which the 
Borda rule or the Copeland method can be manipulated in three-alternative elections and 
derive some analytical representations measuring the vulnerability of these rules to 
strategic misrepresentation of preferences. They show that the Borda rule is significantly 
more vulnerable than the Copeland method.  
 
Conitzer and Sandholm (2002) deal with the level of difficulty of manipulation for 
practical multi-agent settings where the number of voters can be large but the number of 
candidates is small. They show that individual and coalitional manipulations-with 
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unweighted voters- are easy with complete information about others’ votes. However, 
constructive coalitional manipulation with weighted voters turns out to be intractable for 
all of the voting protocols under study, except for the nonrandomized cup. Destructive 
manipulation is shown out to be relatively easy, while randomizing over instantiations of 
the protocols makes the manipulation hard.  Finally, they show that if weighted 
coalitional manipulation with complete information about the others’ votes is hard in 
some voting protocol, then individual and unweighted manipulation is also hard when 
there is uncertainty about the others’ votes. Conitzer, Lang and Sandholm (2003) are 
concerned with the necessary number of candidates to make elections hard to manipulate. 
They show that the voting protocols they study become hard to manipulate with three 
candidates, four candidates, seven candidates or never. Conitzer and Sandholm (2003) 
show how to tweak existing protocols to make manipulation hard, where the tweak 
consists of adding one elimination preround to the election. 
 
Franzese (1999) examines the manipulation of public debt, and suggests an equally 
rational-strategic logic for partisan manipulation. Drazen and Eslava (2005) present a 
model of the political budget cycle in which they consider manipulation via expenditure 
composition. They predict that election-year shifts of the budget improve the incumbent’s 
chances of being re-elected, since voters are manipulated about the incumbent’s true 
preferences for types of spending with a positive probability. They also find that the 
incumbent party is penalized for running large deficits before elections and is rewarded 
for increasing the amount of targeted spending.  
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 Although most of the researchers think that manipulation is a serious problem, there 
are authors who do not worry about manipulations. Hees and Dowding (2005) call certain 
manipulations as ‘sincere’ and ’transparent’ manipulations, and claim that they are 
virtues rather than vices. They show that a class of familiar voting procedures only allows 
sincere and transparent manipulation, so there is no need to fear manipulations. 
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 CHAPTER III 
SUMMARY OF TAYLOR AND YILDIRIM (2005) 
3.1 The Model 
Suppose that there are  voters who may vote in an election between two 
candidates, A and B. Each voter is one of the two types: A voter prefers A, and B voter 
prefers B. A t voter receives payoff 1 if t is implemented and 0 otherwise, for t=A,B 
where cost of voting is  for all voters. Thus all voters have a common value for 
the victory of their candidates, and each possesses two actions, to abstain or to vote for 
his preferred candidate. Voters simultaneously choose whether to vote or not. Majority 
rule is used in the election and ties are broken by a fair coin toss. Each voter privately 
knows his type but believes that another voter is an A voter with probability
2≥n
]1,0(∈c
)1,0(∈λ . 
Taylor and Yildirim compare the symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) outcomes 
of the voting games described across two informational settings. The value of λ  is 
common knowledge among the voters in the informed-voter setting. All the voters have a 
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non-degenerate common prior over possible values of λ  in the uninformed-voter setting. 
All the results listed in this chapter are borrowed from Taylor and Yildirim (2005) 
 
3.2 Informed Voters 
Denote the probability that a t voter casts a vote with tϕ . A symmetric BNE is a 
pair ),( ba ϕϕ  such that it is optimal for a t voter to vote with probability tϕ  when all other 
voters use this strategy. Note that voters compare the expected payoff from voting with 
the payoff from abstaining, to find such an equilibrium; and for the equilibria in totally 
mixed strategies these payoffs must be equal. Let the ex ante probability that an agent 
votes for candidate A and B be denoted respectively by aα and bα , whence aa λϕα =  
and bb ϕλα )1( −= . The number of ways  voters can vote for A,  voters can vote for 
B and  can abstain is 
ak bk
ba kkn −−−1 )!1(!!
)!1(
1,,
1
babababa kknkk
n
kknkk
n
−−−
−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−
−
. 
Lemma 1: The net expected utility to a type t agent from voting can be written as 
cP ttt −),(2
1
'αα  where 
∑
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −
=
−− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−
−=
2
1
0
21
''' )1(21,,
1
),(
n
k
kn
tt
k
t
k
tttt knkk
n
P αααααα  
                 c
knkk
n
n
k
kn
tt
k
t
k
t 2)1(22,1,
12
2
0
22
'
1
' =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−+
−+ ∑
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −
=
−−+ αααα  
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for t=a, b, , and  is the usual operator that rounds a number to the lower integer 
when necessary. 
'tt ≠ [ ]. 
Proposition 1 (Neutrality): Suppose ),( ba ϕϕ  is a symmetric BNE in totally mixed 
strategies; i.e., 0 < tϕ < 1 for t = a, b.  
(i) The ex ante probability that an agent votes for alternative A equals the ex ante 
probability that he votes for B, i.e. ba ϕλλϕ )1( −= . 
(ii) Both outcomes are equally likely in equilibrium, i.e. 
2
1}| winsPr{}| winsPr{ == λλ BA . 
Let α  denote the ex ante probability that an agent votes for one of the two 
candidates in a symmetric totally mixed-strategy BNE when one exists, so he casts a vote 
with probability α2 , which means ]5.0,0(∈α  . Thus to find a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium, we have to find ]5.0,0(∈α  solving 0),(
2
1 =− cnP α  where 
),(),( ααα tPnP = . 
Lemma 2: ),( nP α  is strictly decreasing in ]5.0,0(∈α . 
An important implication of this result is that there is at most one solution to 
0),(
2
1 =− cnP α . Furthermore there is a such solution if and only if cnP >),0(
2
1  and 
cnP ≤),
2
1(
2
1 . Let ),( ncα  denote the solution when it exists. 
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Proposition 2 (Characterization): There exists a unique symmetric mixed-strategy 
BNE if and only if 
2
1)( ≤≤ cnc  and ),(1),( ncnc αλα −<<  where  
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
=
even. isn  if
2
1
2
1
odd isn  if
2
1
2
1
1
)(
n
n
n
n
n
n
nc  
Lemma 3: (i)  is decreasing and converges to zero as . )(nc ∞→n
(ii) ),( ncα  is decreasing and converges to zero as ∞→n . 
Theorem 1 (Neutrality in Large Elections): For any voting cost  and 
any distribution of preferences
)5.0,0(∈c
)1,0(∈λ , there exists a critical population size n  such that 
nn ≥  implies the existence of a unique symmetric BNE ),( ba ϕϕ . Moreover, in this 
equilibrium ba ϕλλϕ )1( −=  and 2
1}| winsPr{}| winsPr{ == λλ BA . 
 
The disturbing results in Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 are a consequence of the 
strategic voting behavior that arises as a result of agents having information about voter 
preferences. When agents do not know the actual value ofλ , the alternative favored by 
the majority is more likely to win. This is demonstrated in the following setting, which 
considers an uninformed voter where n is respectively finite and infinite. 
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3.3 Uninformed Voters 
In this setting λ  is not common knowledge. Suppose that before learning their 
types, the agents’ beliefs about λ  correspond to a non-degenerate common prior 
distribution. Assume that the prior is symmetric and defined over a finite set of values, 
rλλλ <<<< ...0 21 )2( ≥r . From the symmetry of the prior we have iri −+−= 11 λλ  and 
)1,0(}1Pr{}Pr{ ∈=−=== iii θλλλλ  for },...,1{ ni∈∀ . Note that that iri −= θθ  for 
 and . After learning their types, agents’ updated beliefs are },...,1{ ni∈∀ 1
1
=∑
=
r
i
iθ
iiiP λθλλ 2)A|( ==  and )1(2)B|( iiiP λθλλ −==  for },...,1{ ni∈∀ . As in the 
informed voter setting a symmetric BNE is a pair of voting probabilities ),( ba ϕϕ , and 
),( ba ϕϕ  is a symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies if and only if it satisfies 
0c- ]A|))1(,([
2
1 =− baaPE ϕλλϕ  and 0c- ]B|),)1(([2
1 =− abbPE λϕϕλ . 
Proposition 3 (Non-Neutrality): Suppose ),( ba ϕϕ  is symmetric BNE in totally 
mixed strategies. 
(i) Both types of agents vote with the same probability ϕϕϕ == ba . 
(ii) For ∞<n , the candidate favored by the expected majority is more likely to win 
the election,  
2
1  
2
1}| Pr{ >⇔> λλwinsA . 
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To characterize a symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies in the uninformed 
voter setting, recall that the agents vote with the same probability ϕ . Given λ , the 
probability that an agent’s vote is pivotal is ))1(,(),|( ϕλλϕλϕ −= aa PnP  if he is an A 
voter and ),)1((),|( λϕϕλλϕ −= ab PnP  if he is a B voter. Under the symmetric prior, 
each type of agent expects to be pivotal with probability ]t|),|([)|,( nPEnQ t λϕθϕ =  
∑
⎥⎦
⎥⎢⎣
⎢ +
=
=
2
1
1
),,(2
r
i
ii nT λϕθ  for t=a,b where ),-1|()1(),|(),,( nPnPnT iaiiaii λϕλλϕλλϕ −+=  
for 5.0≠iλ  and 2/),.50|()5.0,,( nPnT a ϕϕ = . Hence a symmetric BNE in totally mixed 
strategies corresponds to a solution )1,0()( ∈nϕ  which of the equation 
0)|,(
2
1 =− cnQ θϕ . 
Proposition 4 (Characterization): There exists a unique symmetric BNE in totally 
mixed strategies if and only if 5.0)( << cnc , where 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−
−=
−+
even. is  if,     ]))1([(2)(
odd is  if, ])1([2)()(
2
2
1
2
1
nEnc
nEncnc n
n
nn
n
λλ
λλ  
Corollary 1: For any n, )()( ncnc < , and hence 0)(lim =∞→ ncn . 
This result indicates that if a symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies obtains in 
the informed setting, then an analogous BNE obtains in the uninformed-voter setting too. 
Moreover, for n sufficiently large, existence and uniqueness of these equilibria are 
assured. 
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Proposition 5 (Expected Turnout): Suppose there is a symmetric BNE in totally 
mixed strategies in each of the two informational settings. Then the expected equilibrium 
voter turnout is higher in the informed-voter setting than in the uninformed-voter setting, 
i.e. )(),(2 nnncn ϕα > . 
Definition 1 (Mean-Preserving Spread): Let )',...,','(' 21 rθθθθ =  and 
),...,,( 21 rθθθθ =  be two symmetric distributions over },...,,{ 21 rλλλ . Distribution 'θ  is 
said to be a mean-preserving spread of θ  if there is some ⎣ ⎦} 2/)1(,...,2,1{0 +∈ ri  such 
that  ⎣ ⎦⎩⎨
⎧
++=≤
=≥
. 1)/2(r1,...,i if, '
i1,..., if, '
0ii
0ii
i
i
θθ
θθ
Proposition 6 (Uncertainty): Let 'θ  and θ  be two symmetric priors that 
respectively induce the equilibrium voting probabilities and . If '*'φ *φ θ is a mean-
preserving spread of θ , then . **' φφ ≤
This result indicates that voters are less likely to vote when there is more 
uncertainty about the distribution of voter preferences. 
Theorem 2 (Welfare): Suppose a symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies 
obtains in either informational setting. Then, for any givenλ , expected equilibrium 
welfare is higher in the uninformed-voter setting than in the informed-voter setting.   
This indicates that for a fixed n, expected welfare is higher when voters are 
uninformed. In particular in the uninformed-voter setting, the candidate preferred by the 
majority is more likely to win the election and expected voting costs are strictly less. 
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3.4 Large Elections 
In this section the uninformed-voter setting is studied in the important case as the 
number of agents tends to infinity.  
Lemma 4: (i) )  is decreasing. (* nϕ
(ii) . 0)(lim * =∞→ nn ϕ
(iii) . ∞<∞→ )(lim
* nn
n
ϕ
For a given n and λ , let  and  be the random variables representing the 
equilibrium number of votes for candidates A and B, respectively.  
aX bX
Lemma 5: Let . Then, the limiting marginal distributions of  
and  are independent Poisson distributions with respective means 
mnn
n
=∞→ )(lim
*ϕ aX
bX mλ  and m)1( λ− . 
Lemma 6: Let  and  be two independent random variables that follow 
Poisson distributions with respective means 
aX bX
mλ  and m)1( λ− . Then: 
(i) 0}Pr{lim =+=∞→ kXX bam  for any finite integer k; 
(ii)  if and only if 1}Pr{lim =>∞→ bam XX 2
1>λ . 
Notice that . Applying the 
results of lemma 5 we get  
}1Pr{2}Pr{),),(( * +=+== abiabi XXXXnnT λλϕ
}]1Pr{2}[Pr{lim),),((lim * +=+== ∞→∞→ abiabnin XXXXnnT λλϕ
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∞
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− . Thus, expected 
equilibrium voter turnout in the limit, , is determined by . *m
⎣ ⎦
0),(
2/)1(
0
=−∑+
=
cmJ i
r
i
i λθ
Lemma 7: (i) For  there exists a unique and finite expected equilibrium 
voter turnout in the limit, . 
)5.0,0(∈c
*m
(ii)  is strictly decreasing in c. *m
(iii) For any ∞<M  there exists 0)( >Mc  such that )(Mcc <  implies . Mm >*
Theorem 3 (Non-Neutrality in Large Elections): (i) If , then the candidate 
favored by the majority is more likely to win the election, 
∞→n
2
1
2
1)| Pr{ >⇔> λλwinsA . 
(ii) If , then the probability that the alternative favored by the majority wins 
is arbitrarily close to one when the cost of voting is sufficiently small: 
∞→n
2
11)| Pr{lim
0
>⇔=→ λλwinsAc . 
Theorems 1,2 and 3 tell us that whether elections are large or small, a setting with 
uninformed voters results in electoral outcomes possessing higher expected social 
benefits and lower expected social costs. The difference between the two informational 
regimes is most stark in the case of large elections in which the cost of voting is very 
small.  
 
In this chapter we have reported some results from Taylor and Yildirim (2005) out 
the behavior of the voters when they have some information or belief about the 
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distribution of political preferences. In the next chapter we will consider the behavior of 
the candidates, when they have the power to influence some of the voters’ information 
about the distribution of political preferences, where their influence is restricted in such a 
fashion that a symmetric BNE in totally mixed-strategy obtains for all the voters.  
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CHAPTER IV 
MANIPULATION VIA INFORMATION IN LARGE ELECTIONS 
4.1 The Manipulation Game of Two Candidates with Informed Voters 
The model is almost the same as the one in section 3.2, except that the voters will 
now learn λ  from the companies which predict the distribution of political preferences. 
There are three different types of company: A, B and fair type. For i∈{A,B}, i type 
company supports candidate i, which allows candidate i to release wrong information via 
such a company  and manipulate voters’ information. None of the i voters trust the other 
candidate’s company. Only a portion of the i voters will believe what the  i type company 
says. The ratio of voters who believe in the i company is denoted by . We refer to  as 
the trust ratio of candidate i. The remaining i voters believe in the fair type company’s 
prediction. The only restriction on the manipulation is its cost, which is given by 
 for candidate i
in in
+ℜ→]1,0[:ic ∈{A,B}. ( )i ic λ  is to be interpreted as the cost of making 
the voters who trust i to believe that iλ  is the proportion of i voters in the society, while 
the true value λ  for this proportion is given and fixed.  We assume that this manipulation 
cost function is continuous, increases with the distance between the manipulated value 
and λ , and is zero when there is no manipulation, or in other words the manipulated 
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value is λ .. When A manipulates )1,0(∈aλ  and B releases )1,0(∈bλ , the profit function 
of candidate  is given by: },{ BAi∈
( , , , ) (  wins|(c,n, , )) ( )i a b a b ic n P i c iπ λ λ λ λ λ= −  (1)  
So the cost of manipulation is expressed in units of winning probability. The candidates 
manipulate so as to maximize their profit functions. In order to find the probabilities of 
winning for the candidates, we need to find the voting probabilities of all the voters after 
the manipulations. To be able to use Proposition 1 for this purpose, we should guarantee 
the existence of a symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies in the voter’s game voters 
for all the three predictions of political preferences. As a result of Proposition 2 the 
existence of such a BNE is guaranteed when , and 5.0)( ≤≤ cnc
)),(1),,((,, ncncba ααλλλ −∈ . We assume that c is in the interval  and the cost 
functions satisfy 
]5.0),([ nc
)),(( ncci α ≥1 and )),(1( ncci α− ≥1 for },{ BAi∈  to prevent the 
manipulations outside the interval ( ),( ncα , ),(1 ncα− ). With these assumptions, using 
Proposition 1, we observe that A voters who believe in the A type company vote with 
probability anc λα /),( , B voters who believe in the B type company vote with 
probability )1/(),( bnc λα −  , the remaining A voters vote with probability λα /),( nc  and 
the remaining B voters vote with probability )1/(),( λα −nc . So 
)      ( AcandidateforvotesvoterAP = an
a
nc
λ
α ),(  + (1- )an λ
α ),( nc  
)      ( BcandidateforvotesvoterBP = bn
b
nc
λ
α
−1
),(  + (1- )bn λ
α
−1
),( nc   
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We denote the total number of people who cast a vote in the election –voter turnout- by k 
and define  
bbb
aaa
ba
nn
nn
BcandidateforvotesvoterBP
AcandidateforvotesvoterAP
BcandidateforvotesvoteranyP
AcandidateforvotesvoteranyPK
−+−−
−+=−=
=
1))1/()1((
1)/(
)      ( 
)      ( 
1
                 
)      (
)      (),(
λλ
λλ
λ
λ
λλ
 
Lemma 8: The respective probabilities of A and B winning the election are given 
by: 
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where   a and bλ λ  are values declared by companies A and B, respectively. 
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This lemma relates the probabilities of winning for the candidates  to the probability 
that a  voter votes for candidate A and the probability that a voter votes for candidate B. 
Notice that although the probability that a voter votes for candidate  depends on 
n and c,  the probability of winning for the candidates depends only on 
},{ BAi∈
ba λλλ ,,  and k,  
but not n and c.  
Lemma 9: When the candidates A and B let ba λλ ,  declared respectively, 
2
1)),,,(| (lim1),( =⇒= ∞→ bakba ncwinsAPK λλλλ  
1)),,,(| (lim1),( =⇒> ∞→ bakba ncwinsAPK λλλλ  
1)),,,(| (lim1),( =⇒<
∞→ bakba
ncwinsBPK λλλλ   
Lemma 9 tells us that when the voter turnout is large, there is sharp cut off in the 
manipulation game. The probability of winning the election for any of the candidates can 
be 0, 0.5 or 1, but nothing else is possible. From now on we will assume that the voter 
turnout is large, i.e.  tends to k ∞ . Then, however, we have to show that this is possible 
because voter turnout is endogenous. 
Lemma 10: For any 0>ε , any ∞<M , there exists 0),( >εMc , ℜ∈),( εMN  
such that for ),( εMcc <∀  and ),( εMNn >∀ , ε<< )  ( MturnoutvoterP . 
To interpret this result suppose that the society is large, i.e. n can be taken as large 
as we wish.  Then for sufficiently small voting costs, the probability that the voter turnout 
is higher than a certain value can be made arbitrarily close to 1, and as c approaches to 
zero the voter turnout goes to infinity with a probability which approaches to 1. As we 
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want to make calculations when ∞→k , these calculations will be true only if c goes to 
zero. When , we conclude the following proposition.  ∞→k
Proposition 7: The manipulation game between two candidates does not have any 
Nash equilibrium when ∞→k . 
As there is no Nash equilibrium cooperation of the candidates in the manipulation 
game is impossible. If you oblige the candidates to meet and decide on a procedure of 
manipulation, at least one of them has the incentive to deviate from the designated 
procedure as it is not the best that it can afford.  
 
Now we will consider what happens when the candidates have some beliefs about 
each others’ manipulations. We will use the probability distributions about each others’ 
manipulations as the belief structures. Furthermore, we assume that none of the 
candidates knows what the other candidate thinks about his manipulation for the 
consistency of belief structures. Depending on their prior belief, candidate A maximizes 
his profit by letting declared, where aλ  solves: 
)}1,0(:)(   max{)}1,0(:)(max{ ∈−=∈ aaaaaa cwinsAofyprobabilit λλλλπ  
)}1,0(:)()1),((
2
1)1),((max{ ∈−=+>= aaababa cKPKP λλλλλλ , 
and similarly candidate B solves the following problem: 
)}1,0(:)(   max{)}1,0(:)(max{ ∈−=∈ bbbbbb cwinsBofyprobabilit λλλλπ  
)}1,0(:)()1),((
2
1)1),((max{ ∈−=+<= bbbbaba cKPKP λλλλλλ  
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Now we have to figure out the changes in the magnitude of the function K,  as the 
winner of the election is determined by the magnitude of K at the manipulated values. 
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Using these observations, and assuming that A believes that the manipulations of B 
have a continuous distribution function , and B believes that the manipulations of A 
have a continuous distribution function , the problem of the candidates can be stated in 
the terms of cumulative distribution functions. Candidate A chooses 
bf
af
],0( λλ ∈a  which 
maximizes: 
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and candidate B chooses )1,[λλ ∈b  which maximizes: 
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Notice that there can be multiple solutions to these maximization problems. To 
single out a unique solution, we assume that the candidates prefer the manipulation with 
the least cost most among the expected profit maximizers. If 1),( >baK λλ , the winner of 
the election is candidate A; if 1),( =baK λλ , each candidate can win the election with a 
probability of 0.5, and otherwise candidate B wins the election. The following example 
will clarify how these implications work. 
Example 1: Let B believe that A’s manipulation is uniformly distributed on ],0( λ , 
and let A believe that B’s manipulation is uniformly distributed on )1,[λ . Moreover, let 
the cost function be affine, namely, 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∈−
−
∈−
==
]1,(x, 
1
][0,x, 
)()(
λλ
λ
λλ
λ
x
x
xcxc ba .  
Using the density and cost functions for maximizing )( aa λπ , )( bb λπ , it turns out 
that A manipulates aλ  which is an element of  and B manipulates int{0, } aλ ∪Λ bλ  which 
is an element of ,where int{ ,1} bλ ∪Λ intaΛ  is the set of  all interior extreme points 
, which satisfy: ),0( λλ ∈ma
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and similarly  is the set of  all  which satisfy: intbΛ )1,(λλ ∈mb
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Choosing expected profit maximizers from the given sets, we get the following results: 
⇒= ba nn 0)( =aa λπ  for ],0[ λλ ∈∀ a , 0)( =bb λπ  for ⇒∈∀ ]1,[λλb λλ =a , 
⇒= λλb  A and B has equal probabilities for winning the election. 
⇒> ba nn
ba
a
a nn
n
+=
λλ , ⇒>⇒= 1),( bab K λλλλ  A wins the election. 
⇒< ba nn λλ =a , ⇒<⇒+
−−= 1),()1(1 ba
ba
b
b Knn
n λλλλ  B wins the election. 
This result differs from those in previous researches. The probabilities of winning 
the election for both of the candidates are equal in Campbell (1999), Goeree and Grosser 
(2004), Taylor and Yildirim (2005). The power of a candidate’s manipulation is normally 
expected to increase if his trust ratio increases. In this example as the cost function is 
same for both of the players and all possible manipulations have a cost less than 1, the 
analysis is not disturbed by cost functions. We conclude that the winner depends only on 
the trust ratios. On the other hand if some disturbing results occur for different cost 
functions, the underlying reason will be that the candidates do not know anything about 
each others’ beliefs and so their guesses about each others profit maximizing 
manipulation are not perfect. 
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The analysis of the setup with belief can be improved. But we will not pursue such 
an analysis any further and turn to exploring other possible equilibria of the manipulation 
game. Until now we assumed that the candidates manipulate simultaneously. Now we 
will consider what happens when they manipulate sequentially. We will assume that there 
is a social organizer who has the power to oblige the candidates to manipulate in a given 
order. One’s intuition tells that if the candidate who starts the game makes a small 
manipulation, the other candidate will win the game with manipulation which is a bit 
large, and thus the first manipulation turns out to be meaningless. If the first manipulator 
increases the size of his manipulation, the other may match it accordingly. But they both 
have a constraint on the feasible set of manipulations, since the cost of manipulation 
should not be more than 1. Depending on their feasible sets the result of the game 
changes. If the second mover can win against any feasible manipulation of the candidate 
who moves first then, being rational, the first player should not make any manipulation, 
and the second candidate would win with a small manipulation. Otherwise, the first 
candidate has a feasible manipulation against which the second candidate has no feasible 
manipulation that would yield him a positive profit. In that case by making that 
manipulation, the first candidate wins the election. Now let us clarify the borders of these 
possible results with a proposition. But before stating the proposition, we will denote the 
manipulations which have unit cost with  and  respectively, i.e. 
 and .  
),0(* λ∈a )1,(* λ∈b
1)( * =aca 1)( * =bcb
Proposition 8: For sufficiently large k, the following results are satisfied for 
.  5.0<∀c
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(I) A always wins. If A manipulates first, ⇒−>−− **** )()1()( anbbna ba λλ
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 is a Stackelberg equilibrium; and when B manipulates first 
there is an ε -equilibrium. In this case, A wants to be second player to reduce the cost of 
manipulation, which order also increases the social welfare by decreasing the voter 
turnout. 
(II) B always wins. If B manipulates first, ⇒−<−− **** )()1()( anbbna ba λλ
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λλλ  is a Stackelberg equilibrium; and when A manipulates first there 
is an ε -equilibrium. In this case, B wants to be second player to reduce the cost of 
manipulation, which order also increases the social welfare by decreasing the voter 
turnout. 
(III)  No matter who manipulates first there is 
an 
⇒−=−− **** )()1()( anbbna ba λλ
ε -equilibrium, but both of the candidates want to be the second player to win the 
election. 
This proposition shows that the effect of manipulation can be made as small as we 
want but still positive by an appropriately sequencing the manipulations. The unit cost 
manipulations are the only crucial values in determining the winner, where the particular 
forms of the cost functions are not effective. The candidate, for whom the cost of 
manipulation is less in the sense given above, wins the election; and he should 
manipulate as the second for the benefit of both himself and the society. On the other 
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hand, there is a competition for second movement when none of the candidates is 
superior to each other. The above proposition shows that in fact neither the candidates 
nor the society like the manipulations, but the candidates have the incentive to manipulate 
in order to guarantee their victory.  
 
The results so far are under the assumption that the voters believe that they are well 
informed about the composition of political preferences in the society. In the following 
section, we consider what happens if the voters are not well informed about the 
distributions of voter preferences. 
 
4.2 The Manipulation Game of Two Candidates with Uninformed Voters 
The model is the same as the one in section 3.2 except that the agents’ learn θ  from 
the companies which predict the distribution of political preferences, where the 
companies have three different types: A, B and fair type. For i∈{A,B}, i type company 
supports candidate i, which allows candidate i to release false information to his favor. 
Similar to the previous section no voter believes the announcement of the other 
candidate’s company and  represents the trust ratio of candidate i. The remaining i 
voters believe in the fair type company’s prediction,
in
θ , which is the true value without 
manipulation. Manipulation again is restricted since it is costly. The cost is given by 
+ℜ→∆ric :  for candidate i∈{A,B}. We assume that 1)mθ( ≥ic , 0)( =θic , )(xci  
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increases with spreading  and x )()( ycxc ii =  for  resulting in the same 
probability of voting for all types of agents. Here 
ryx ∆∈∀ ,
mθ  is the minimum symmetric spread, 
so for odd values of r  )0,...,0,1,0,...,0(=mθ  with 1 in the ( 2
1+r ) th column, and for 
even values of r . )0,...,0,
2
1,
2
1,0,...,0(=mθ  with 2
1  in the  (
2
r ) th and (
2
2+r ) th 
columns. When A chooses  and B chooses , where ra ∆∈θ rb ∆∈θ
,)1( iraai −+= θθ )1( irbbi −+= θθ  for },...,1{ ni∈∀ , the profit function of candidate  is: },{ BAi∈
)()),(| wins(),( iibabai ciP θθθθθπ −=  (4) 
The candidates manipulate so as to maximize their profits. We will find the 
probability of winning for the candidates, by using the voting probabilities of the voters 
after the manipulations. From proposition 3, we know that )1,0(∈ϕ , the probability of 
voting for the voters who believes in θ , solves 
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when these voting probabilities constitute a symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies. 
To be able to use this result, we have to guarantee the existence of such equilibria in the 
game voters’ for all the three predictions of political preferences. As a result of 
Proposition 4 this is guaranteed when 5.0)( << cnc . From the Corollary 1 of Proposition 
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4, we know that 0)(lim →
∞→
nc
n
. Thus when n tends to infinity, the existence conditions in 
Proposition 4 are satisfied for )5.0,0(∈∀c , all possible sets of possible values of λ  and 
all possible symmetric manipulations. Note that ϕ  solves cnP 2),,(* =ϕθ  with 
),,( θϕϕ nc= .  Then the voters believing in aθ  vote with probability ),,( aa nc θϕϕ = . 
Similarly, voters believing in bθ  vote with probability ),,( bb nc θϕϕ = , and the 
remaining agents vote with probability ),,( θϕϕ nc= .  Thus a voter votes for candidate A 
with probability ))1(( aaa nn −+ϕϕλ , and for candidate B with probability 
))1()(1( bbb nn −+− ϕϕλ . Using these probabilities, we get that candidate A wins the 
election with the following probability: 
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))1((
)      (
)      (),(
bbb
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BcandidateforvotesvoteranyP
AcandidateforvotesvoteranyPK −+−
−+== ϕϕλ
ϕϕλϕϕ . 
Using the same argument as in Lemma 9 we get 
1)),(| (lim1),( =⇒>
∞→ bakba
winsAPK θθϕϕ   
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1)),(| (lim1),( =⇒<
∞→ bakba
winsBPK θθϕϕ  
2
1)),(| (lim)),(| (lim1),( ==⇒=
∞→∞→ bakbakba
winsBPwinsAPK θθθθϕϕ  
Let’s examine the function ),( baK ϕϕ  as it determines the effect of manipulation. 
0
))1()(1(
),( >−+−=∂
∂
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nn
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ϕϕλ
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))1()(1(
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nnnK
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The above calculations show us that A wants to increase aϕ , and similarly B wants 
to increase bϕ  to win the election. Proposition 6 tells us that both of the candidates will 
have the aim of minimizing the symmetric spread of θ  when manipulation is profitable 
for them. As in the previous section, we will assume that the voter turnout is large. Again 
we have to show that this is possible, since the voter turnout is endogenous. 
Lemma 11: When ∞→n , for any 0>ε , any ∞<M , there exists 0),( >εMc  
such that for ),( εMcc <∀ , ε<< )  ( MturnoutvoterP . 
We can interpret this lemma such that ∞→k  when . Noticing this fact, from 
now on we will assume that tends to 
0→c
k ∞ . For simplicity in the calculations we will 
denote the manipulation  A whose cost is 1 by  , the manipulation by B whose cost is 1 
by   and the cost functions with  where 
*
aϕ
*
bϕ +ℜ→]1,0[:ic )()( ycxc ii =  for  such that y∀
),( ycx ϕ=  for {a,b}. ∈i
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Proposition 9: If 
a
a
a n
n
λ
λλϕϕ )1()1(* −−−≤  or 
b
b
b n
n
)1(
)1)(1(*
λ
λλϕϕ −
−−−≤ , then 
),(),( ϕϕϕϕ =ba  is a Nash equilibrium. Otherwise there is no Nash equilibrium.   
This proposition tells us that cooperation is impossible unless one of the candidates 
wins the election even without making any manipulation, whatever manipulation is 
undertaken by the other candidate with a cost less than 1. Similar to the informed setup, 
the candidates do not have any idea about each other, and we can improve our setup by 
assuming that each candidate has a prior belief about the probability distribution of the 
other candidate’s manipulation. We assume that that they do not know what the other 
candidate believes about them to make their beliefs consistent. Otherwise, if the 
candidates know each others’ beliefs, then they will exactly know what the other will 
play. But then they will also know that the other knows what he will play for sure,in 
which case at least for one of them deviating from his strategy would be profitable which 
will also contradict that he played his profit maximizing strategy. Assuming that voter 
turnout is large, A chooses aλ  which results in the voting probability aϕ  that solves: 
}:)(max{ aaa ϕϕπ ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −=+>= aaababa cKPKP ϕϕϕϕϕϕ :)(2
)1),((
)1),((max , 
and similarly B chooses bλ  which results in the voting probability bϕ  that solves: 
=}:)(max{ bbb ϕϕπ ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −=+< bbbbaba cKPKP ϕϕϕϕϕϕ :)(2
)1),((
)1),((max  
We now turn to examining the magnitude of the function K as it determines the 
winning probabilities of the candidates. 
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Assuming candidate A’s belief about candidate B’s manipulations has a continuous 
distribution function , and candidate B’s belief has a continuous distribution function 
,  and using the above observation, the candidates’ problem becomes the following: 
Candidate A chooses the manipulation which causes the voters believing him to vote with 
the probability  that maximizes: 
bf
af
],[ *aa ϕϕϕ ∈
)(
)1(
))1)(1()1((
)( aa
b
baaa
baa cn
nnnF ϕλ
λλϕλϕϕπ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−−−+=  , 
and candidate B chooses the appropriate manipulation which causes a corresponding 
voting probability  that maximizes: ],[ *bb ϕϕϕ ∈
)(
))1()1)(1(()1(
)( bb
a
abbb
abb cn
nnnF ϕλ
λλϕϕλϕπ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−−+−= .  
Notice that there may be multiple solutions to these maximization problems. The 
candidates prefer the manipulation with the smallest cost in these cases. Let us denote the 
solution to this problem by . Then, A wins the election if ; when 
 each candidate can win with equal probability and B wins the election 
when . The following example will clarify how these implications work: 
),( mb
m
a ϕϕ 1),( >mbmaK ϕϕ
1),( =mbmaK ϕϕ
1),( <mbmaK ϕϕ
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Example 2: Let B believe that A’s manipulation is uniformly distributed on 
],[ aϕϕ , and let A believe that B’s manipulation is uniformly distributed on ],[ bϕϕ , 
where the maximum reasonable manipulations are 
]}),[for  1),(:],[{}inf({ *** bbbaaaaa K ϕϕϕϕϕϕϕϕϕϕ ∈∀>∈∪=  and 
]}),[for  1),(:],[{}inf({ *** aababbbb K ϕϕϕϕϕϕϕϕϕϕ ∈∀>∈∪= . The cost functions are 
affine, such that ],[ x  where)( ** a
a
a
xxc ϕϕϕϕ
ϕ ∈−
−=   and   )( * ϕϕ
ϕ
−
−=
b
b
xxc where 
. Define ],[ x *bϕϕ∈ ))1()(1(
))1((
*
*
*
bbb
aaa
nn
nnK −+−
−+= ϕϕλ
ϕϕλ
, and 
a
b
b
a
n
nD λ
λ
ϕϕ
ϕϕ )1(
*
* −−−
−=  where 
*K  is the value of function K when both of the candidates resort to manipulations with 
unit cost, or in other words the most costly manipulations possible. We know that the 
profit functions are maximized either by interior solutions where the derivative with 
respect to the voting probability is zero or by values on the boundary. Using this 
information with the given density and cost functions we get the following results: 
⇒= 1*K  ϕϕ =a , ⇒=ϕϕb ⇒−= λ
λϕϕ
1
),( baK if 2
1>λ  A wins the election, if 
2
1=λ  , A and B have equal probability of winning; and if 
2
1<λ , B wins the election; 
1* <K and  ⇒≥ 0D ϕϕ =a , ϕϕ =b  ⇒  λ
λϕϕ −= 1),( baK  ⇒  same results with 1
* =K  
1* <K  and  ⇒< 0D ϕϕ =a  , 
b
ba
b
a
abb n
nn
n
n
)1(
)1)(1()1(
)1(
*
λ
λλϕλ
λϕϕϕ −
−−−−+−==   
                             ⇒ ⇒< 1),( baK ϕϕ  B wins the election  
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1* >K  and  ⇒≤ 0D ϕϕ =a , ⇒=ϕϕb ⇒−= λ
λϕϕ
1
),( baK  same results with 1
* =K  
1* >K  and  ⇒> 0D
a
ab
a
b
baa n
nn
n
n
λ
λλϕλ
λϕϕϕ )1()1)(1()1(* −−−−+−==  , ϕϕ =b   
                             ⇒ ⇒> 1),( baK ϕϕ  A wins the election  
 
After observing the results of the example above, we change our model in the same 
manner as we have done in the informed voters setting, and oblige the candidates to 
manipulate sequentially one after other. The results are similar, but the main difference is 
that in the present setup the candidates take care of the voting probabilities obtained after 
the manipulations, as the function K depends on the voting probabilities, not the 
manipulated ratios of A voters in the society. 
   Proposition 10: Assume that 
a
a
a n
n
λ
λλϕϕ )1()1(* −−−≥  and 
b
b
b n
n
)1(
)1)(1(*
λ
λλϕϕ −
−−−≥  .  
(I) A always wins. If A manipulates first ⇒> 1*K
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−−+−= ϕλ
λλϕλ
λϕϕϕ ,)1()1)(1()1(),( *
a
ab
a
b
bba n
nn
n
n
 is a Stackelberg equilibrium, 
and if B manipulates first there exists an ε -equilibrium. A wants to be the second player 
to reduce the cost of manipulation, which also increases the social welfare. 
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(II) B always wins. If B manipulates first ⇒< 1*K
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nn
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 is a Stackelberg equilibrium. If A 
manipulates first there exists an ε -equilibrium. B wants to be the second player to reduce 
the cost of manipulation, which also increases the social welfare. 
(III)  there exists an ⇒= 1*K ε -equilibrium no matter who manipulates first. Both 
of the candidates want to be the second player to win the election. 
The voting probabilities, caused by unit cost manipulations, determine the winner of 
the elections similar to the informed case. The shape of the cost function just affects the 
cost of manipulations for the candidates, and not the winner. Neither the candidates nor 
the society like manipulation, but the candidates have an incentive to deviate a bit for 
winning, and when the candidate who has the power to win the election manipulates first, 
he has to choose his maximal reasonable value to guarantee a victory. Thus, for 
decreasing the effect of manipulations a social organizer should oblige an appropriate 
order of manipulation. As a result of this proposition, the results of example 2 turn out to 
be disturbing too. When A is the stronger candidate, so that 1* >K , B can win the game. 
Similarly when B is the stronger candidate, A can win the game. These cases occur 
because the candidates’ guesses about each other are very bad in extreme cases where the 
boundary values are manipulated.  
 
So far we have assumed that the society is ignorant of the candidates’ 
manipulations. In the next section we examine whether the society can prevent the effects 
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of the manipulations when they have more information, where the candidates are 
unaware of this knowledge of the society. 
 
4.3 The Properties of a Society Which Can Prevent the Manipulation 
 
4.3.1 - Informed Voters 
 
Suppose that there are three different regions each containing one of the three types 
of companies. In the region where the t type company is located, the portion of the t 
voters who live in that region is given by  for tn },{ bat ∈ , and in the region where fair 
type company is located the remaining voters live. For },{ bat ∈ , we assume that the t 
type company can manipulate only all people in its region. Moreover, people living in 
same region as the fair type company know the manipulations as well as  and , 
exactly as the fair type company reveals this information in its region. But the candidates 
are assumed to be unaware of this fact. We assume that the necessary conditions for the 
existence of a symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in totally mixed strategies are 
satisfied and . As a result of the unawareness of the candidates, the voters 
living in the same region with the fair type company may prevent the effects of 
manipulations if the manipulations are small in the sense stated in the following 
proposition. 
an bn
)1,0(},{ ⊂ba nn
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Proposition 11: The society can prevent the manipulation ( , )a bλ λ  if λ
λa
an <  and 
λ
λ
−
−<
1
1 bbn . 
Using this proposition in Example 1, we can calculate that the society can prevent 
manipulation in the following cases: 
⇒> ba nn
ba
a
a nn
n
+=
λλ , λλ =b  are chosen by the candidates, so when 
ba
a
a nn
n
n +<  and  the society can prevent the manipulations. The second 
inequality is always satisfied and the first one is satisfied only when 
1 <bn
1<+ baa nnn . 
⇒< ba nn λλ =a , 
ba
b
b nn
n
+
−−= )1(1 λλ  are chosen by the candidates. When 1<an  and 
ba
b
b nn
n
n +<  the society can prevent manipulation. The first inequality is always 
satisfied, the second is satisfied only when 1<+ bab nnn .  
 
As a result of this simple example we can say that when the trust ratios of the 
candidates are less than half, i.e. 5.0<an  and 5.0<bn , manipulation can be prevented.  
Corollary 2: When λ
α ),( ncna ≤  and λ
α
−≤ 1
),( ncnb  the society can prevent all 
manipulations which have a cost less than 1. 
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Corollary 3: It is always possible to manipulate in large societies, as long as all the 
manipulations on the (0,1) interval have a cost less than one. 
Corollary 3 shows us that large societies are more manipulable. But we shall not 
forget that the cost of manipulation increases with the size of the society, and the 
candidates think that the society is ignorant about their manipulations. Thus, it is still 
possible that large societies may prevent manipulation as well. Now we will consider the 
uninformed-voters setting and see what the society’s power is in preventing manipulation 
when the society is ignorant about the distribution of the political preferences. 
  
4.3.2 - Uninformed Voters 
 
Let ,  and assume that the voters who are not manipulated, know 
exactly what portions of A and B voters are manipulated. In other words, they know  
and . The candidates are unaware of the voters’ knowledge, and this unawareness is 
used by the voters to prevent manipulation. The underlying scenario is the same as in the 
informed-voters setting. First of all let us define the: 
)1,0(},{ ⊂ba nn
an
bn
minϕ : The minimal value of the voting probability of a person that can be reached 
by candidates’ manipulation 
maxϕ : The maximum value of the voting probability of a person that can be reached 
by the candidates’ manipulation 
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We know that  and , where cnP 2),,( minmax
* =ϕθ cnP 2),,( maxmin* =ϕθ maxθ  is the 
maximum symmetric spread of the prior, )
2
1,0,...,0,
2
1(max =θ , and minθ  is the minimum 
symmetric prior, mθθ =min . These two equations give us the values of minϕ  and maxϕ . 
The following proposition clarifies the manipulations that can be prevented by the society 
by using mixed strategies, and the corollaries show necessary conditions for preventing 
all possible effects of manipulations about the winner of the election.  
 Proposition 12: The society can prevent the manipulation ( , )a bθ θ  when 
⎭⎬
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ϕ
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1
1,min  where ),,( aa nc θϕϕ = , ),,( bb nc θϕϕ =  
and ),,( θϕϕ nc= . 
Corollary 4: The society can prevent all possible manipulations when 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
−<
minmax 1
1,min ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
an  and ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
−<
minmax 1
1,min ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
bn . 
Corollary 5: It is always possible to manipulate large societies when 0max ≠−ϕϕ . 
Corollary 5 shows us that in large societies, so long as there is a positive probability 
of changing the voting probabilities of some voters, the aware voters can prevent only 
some of the manipulations but not all of them. As a result of this, if the candidates 
become aware of the voters’ knowledge, they can affect the results of the elections.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In this study we presented a simple model where voters have probabilistic 
preferences over two candidates, and examined the behavior of candidates regarding  the 
impact of their manipulations of the distribution of political preferences on equilibrium 
voting behavior, winner of the election and social welfare. Our results, for two different 
settings-informed and uninformed voters- demonstrate that both the candidates and the 
society suffer from manipulations. In order to mitigate the negative effects of 
manipulation in equilibrium, a social organizer has to have sufficient information about 
the candidates’ cost functions and set the rules for the manipulation game accordingly. 
Moreover, when the voters who are not manipulated know the manipulated values 
together with the number of manipulated people, the society can prevent the effects of 
certain manipulations on the winner of the election. Our results are derived under the 
assumption that voters’ benefits are correctly measured by the chance of being pivotal, 
and the parameters satisfy the necessary conditions for the existence of symmetric 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies. 
 
Further studies can examine the effects of the repetition of the manipulation game 
to explain why many countries ban making statements about the distribution of voters’ 
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preferences before the elections. The effects of combined manipulations which have been 
studied separately in the literature so far naturally deserve further consideration. Such 
studies may also lead to more profitable manipulations on the part of candidates. But the 
most valuable contributions of these studies would be to design institutions that prevent 
losses in social welfare due to manipulations, possibly by revealing true information 
about the composition of the society along with the possible manipulations this 
composition results in. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45
APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 8: Let’s say that A voters who believe aλ  vote with probability 
1aϕ , the remaining A voters vote with probability 2aϕ , B voters who believe bλ  vote 
with probability 1bϕ , the remaining B voters vote with probability 2bϕ . Using Proposition 
1 we have: 
),(1 ncaa αϕλ =  , ),(2 nca αλϕ =  , ),()1( 1 ncbb αϕλ =−  , ),()1( 2 ncb αϕλ =−  
a
a
nc
λ
αϕ ),(1 =⇒  , λ
αϕ ),(2 nca =  , 
b
b
nc
λ
αϕ −= 1
),(
1  , λ
αϕ −= 1
),(
2
nc
b  
),(1)1(),,()    ( 21 ncn
nnnncPAforvotesvoteranyP a
a
a
aaaaaa αλ
λϕλϕλλ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+=−+==⇒
 
                               )1)(1()1(),,()    ( 21 bbbbbb nnncPBforvotesvoteranyP ϕλϕλλ −−+−==⇒
 
),()1(
1
),()1( ncnncn b
b
b αλ
αλ −+−−=  
Using these equations we can find the probability of A winning the election. Let’s 
denote the total number of agents who vote in the election by .  k
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Dividing both the nominator and denominator by , we get the desired result 
for 
k
bb ncP )),,(( λ
)),,,(| ( bancwinsAP λλ . On the other hand, as 
)),(| (1)),(| ( baba winsAPwinsBP λλλλ −= , just by dividing the numerator and the 
denominator by , we get equation (3). kbaK ),( λλ
 
Proof of Lemma 9: We will prove this fact in two parts, k is odd and  k is even. 
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Proof of Lemma 10:  
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Claim: For ,  such that for , +ℜ∈∀K ++ ℵ∈ℜ∈∃ KK Nc , KNn >∀ Kcc <∀  
Knnc >),(α . 
Proof: Take 1
4
1 −−= KK ec . Assume there exists no  satisfying the desired 
conditions. Then there exists a sequence  such that 
+ℵ∈KN
∞
=1}{ iin Knncz iii ≤= ),(α . Then 
 is a bounded sequence in the closed set . So there exists a convergent 
subsequence. Without loss of generality treat the sequence itself as a convergent 
sequence. Then . Make a new sequence  such that 
∞
=1}{ iiz ],0[ K
KAzii ≤=∞→lim
∞
=1}{ iiβ ),( ii ncαβ =  if 
, and ∞=∈ 1}{ iini iAi /=β  otherwise. Then  )limexp()1(limlim iiiiiii iAi βββ ∞→∞→∞→ −=−⇒=
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MA ee −− ≥= . So  such that  for .  Then for 
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∞
=∈∀ 1}{ iinη N≥η , ),( ηαβη Kc=  and so . This 
contradicts that . So our claim is true.  
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As 0>ε , there exists  such that +ℵ∈l l/1>ε . For MK l= , 
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MturnoutvoterP  for Kcc <∀  and KNn >∀ . 
So take KcMc =),( ε  and KNMN =),( ε . 
 
Proof of Proposition 7: Let’s assume that this game has a Nash equilibrium, 
),( ba λλ .  
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⇒< 1),( baK λλ  B wins the game, so A manipulates λλ =a  to maximize 
),,,( baa nc λλπ  by definition of Nash equilibrium. Then 
⇒< 1),( baK λλ λλλλλλ >+>⇒> 2
b
bb . If B had chosen 2
λλ +b  , 
⇒<+ 1)
2
,(
λλλ baK 1))2,,,(| ( =
+ λλλ bancwinsBP , and )2()(
λλλ +> bbbb cc  because 
 increases with increasing )(xcb )1,(λ∈x .Thus B increases his profit by playing 2
λλ +b , 
so  
2
λλ +b  strictly dominates bλ  which contradicts that ),( ba λλ  is a Nash equilibrium. 
 
⇒> 1),( baK λλ  A wins the game, so B chooses λλ =b  to maximize his profit. 
Then we have ⇒> 1),( baK λλ ⇒<+<⇒< λλλλλλ 2
a
aa ⇒>+ 1),2( b
aK λλλ  
1)),
2
,,(| ( =+ bancwinsAP λλλ . On the other hand as )2()(
λλλ +> aaaa cc , playing 
2
λλ +a  strictly dominates aλ  which contradicts that ),( ba λλ  is a Nash equilibrium.  
 
2
1    )),,,(| (    )),,,(| (    1),( ==⇒= bababa ncwinsBPncwinsAPK λλλλλλ . 
Candidates guarantee that 0),,,( ≥baa nc λλπ  and 0),,,( ≥bab nc λλπ  as they have the 
chance of not manipulating, and ),( ba λλ  is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, 2
1)( ≤aac λ  and 
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2
1)( ≤bbc λ . As  is a continuous function there exists  such that )(xca x ax λ<<0  and 
)()(
2
)(6.0
aaa
aa cxcc λλ >>+ . As K is a decreasing function in its first variable we have 
1),( >bxK λ   ⇒ 1)),,,(| ( =bxncwinsAP λ   ⇒ 2
)(6.0
1),,,( aaba
cxnc λλπ +−>  
)(
2
1
2
)(
7.0 aa
aa cc λλ −>−= . Thus ),( bx λ  strictly dominates ),( ba λλ  which contradicts 
that ),( ba λλ  is Nash equilibrium. Thus there isn’t any Nash equilibrium of this game. 
 
Proof of Proposition 8: Let A start the game and choose aλ , and as a best response 
B choose bλ . First of all let’s analyze how K changes with respect to its variables. 
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A wants to make 1),( >baK λλ and B wants to make 1),( <baK λλ , so A decreases 
 till *aa ≥λ 1),( >baK λλ  and if this isn’t possible he doesn’t manipulate. Similarly B 
increases  till *bb ≤λ 1),( <baK λλ  and if this isn’t possible he doesn’t manipulate. So 
the critical value of the function K is: 
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(i)  whatever  the first 
player  chooses the second player 
***** )()1()(1 anbbnaK ba λλ −=−−⇔= ⇒ },{ *ii λλ ∉
},{ bai∈ j  has the ability of making 1),( >jiK λλ  and 
1),( <jiK λλ  by choosing appropriate  so that *jj ≠λ j  wins the election. So choosing 
 causes only a positive cost to i , so i  doesn’t choose },{ *ii λλ ∉ { }*, ii λλ ∉ . If λλ =i  
then for 0>∀ε  there exists  such that ),( * λjx∈ 1)),,,(| ( =xncwinsjP λ  and 
ε<)(xc j  so that ελπ −> 1),,,( xncj  since  is a continuous function of . On the 
other hand if i  chooses , then the best response of 
)(xc j x
*ii =λ j  isλ , which makes 
. But if i  chooses0),,,(),,,( ** == λπ jλπ incinci λλ =i , then an bestε −   best response 
of j  will be close toλ , which makes 1),,,( ,0),,,( ≅= jjji ncnc λλπλλπ . Thus λ  
dominates , and so  doesn’t choose . As a result i  doesn’t manipulate. On the other 
hand the maximum possible value of the profit is 1 and 
*i i *i
j  can achieve a profit arbitrarily 
close to this value. So there is an ε -equilibrium. 
 
(ii)  If A is the second player 
whatever  B chooses,  such that 
⇔> 1*K ⇒−>−− **** )()1()( anbbna ba λλ
],[ *bb λλ ∈ ),( ** λaa ∈∃ 1),( * =baK λ .  So A guarantees 
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2
1),,,( ),,,( ** acancnc ababaa −=≥ λπλλπ  and for )5.0,0(∈∀ε  there exists 
),( *
* aaa ∈  such that ε+< )()( *acac aa , and ⇒>⇒<   1),(    * baKaa λ  
ελπ −−>−= )(1)(1),,,( *acacanc aaba ),,,(),,,( * baba ancanc λπλπ >⇒ . On the other 
hand 0)(1),,,( >−= acanc aba λπ , so winning the election is better for A than a tie in 
election or loosing the election. Knowing this fact chooses λλ =b  to minimize his 
manipulation cost and thus to maximize his profit. Then for 0>∀ε  there exists 
 such that ),( * λε aa ∈ εε <)(aca , and 
ελπλλ εεεε −>−=⇒>⇒< 1)(1),,,(1),(* acancaKa aa , where the maximal value of 
aπ  is 1. Thus we have an ε -equilibrium. 
 
Let A be the first player. Now  such that . So when A 
chooses 
),( ** λaa ∈∃ 1),( ** =baK
],( * λλ aa ∈ ,   such that ),[ ** bb λ∈∃ 1),( * =bK aλ . So B guarantees a profit of  
)(
2
1),,,( ** bcbnc bab −=λπ  and )5.0,0(∈∀ε  there exists ),( ** bbb ∈  such that 
ε+< )()( *bcbc bb , and as K decreases in its second variable 
),,,()(1)(1),,,(1),( *** bncbcbcbncbKbb abbbaba λπελπλ >−−>−=⇒<⇒>  . B 
guarantees a positive profit as 0)(1),,,( >−= bcbnc bab λπ . So winning the election is 
better for B than a tie in election or loosing the election. As a result, if A chooses 
),( * λλ aa ∈ , then 0≤aπ . If A manipulates *aa =λ , then by choosing , B can *bb =λ
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make 1),( * =baK λ  and so 2
1)(
2
1),,,( ** −=−= bcanc bbb λπ , or by choosing 
, ),[ *bb λλ ∈ )(),,,( * bbbb canc λλπ −= , and as is easily seen the best response of B is to 
choose λλ =b . Thus )(1),,,( ** acanc aa −=λπ . If  A chooses *aa <λ , then for 
 1],[ *bb λλ ∈∀ ),( >baK λλ , so B doesn’t manipulate. Thus )(1),,,( aaaa cnc λλλπ −= . 
From all the possible strategies it is seen that choosing *aa =λ  maximizes the profit of 
A. Now let’s determine the exact value of .  *a 1),(
*
* =baK
⇒−+−
−=⇒   
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 is a Stackelberg 
equilibrium. 
 
(iii)  If B is the second player 
whatever  A chooses, there exists  such that 
⇔< 1*K ⇒−<−− **** )()1()( anbbna ba λλ
],[ ** λλ aa ∈ ),( ** bb λ∈ 1),( * =bK aλ . So B 
guarantees )(
2
1),,,( ** bcbnc bab −=λπ . For )5.0,0(∈∀ε  there exists ),( ** bbb ∈ such 
that ε+< )()( *bcbc bb , and as K decreases with respect to its second variable is negative, 
ελπλ −−>−=⇒<⇒< )(1)(1),,,(1),( ** bcbcbncbKbb bbaba  ),,,( *bnc ab λπ> . On 
the other hand,  0)(1),,,( >−= bcbnc bab λπ , so winning the election is better for B than 
a tie in election or loosing the election. Thus, A chooses λλ =a  to minimize )( aac λ . 
Then for 0>∀ε  there exists  such that ),( *bb λε ∈ εε <)(bcb , and 
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ελπλλ εεεε −>−=⇒<⇒> 1)(1),,,(1),( bcbncbKb bb . Thus we have an ε -
equilibrium. 
 
Let B be the first player. Now  such that . If B 
chooses
),( ** bb λ∈∃ 1),( ** =baK
),[ *bb λλ ∈ , then   such that ],( ** λaa ∈∃ 1),( * =baK λ . So A guarantees 
)(
2
1),,,( ** acanc aba −=λπ . There exists ),( ** aaa ∈  such that ε+< )()( *acac aa  for 
)5.0,0(∈∀ε , and >−−>−=⇒>⇒< ελπλ )(1)(1),,,(1),( ** acacancaKaa aabab  
),,,( * ba anc λπ . Taking into consideration that 0)(1),,,( >−= acanc aba λπ , it can be 
seen that winning the election is better for A than a tie or defeat in the election. If B 
chooses ),( *bb λλ ∈  he earns a negative profit. If he chooses *bb =λ , then the best 
response of A is to choose λλ =a . Because by choosing  A can make *aa =λ
1),( * =bK aλ  and so 2
1)(
2
1),,,( ** −=−= acbnc aaa λπ , or by choosing 
,],( * λλ aa ∈ )(),,,( * aaaa cbnc λλπ −= . Thus, )(1),,,( ** bcbnc bb −=λπ . If B 
chooses *bb >λ , then as for  1],[ * λλ aa ∈∀ ),( >baK λλ , A doesn’t manipulate, and B 
gets )(1),,,( bbbb cnc λλλπ −= . From all the possible strategies it is seen that playing 
*bb =λ  is the best manipulation for B. Let’s find the exact value of . *b
⇒+−
+−=⇒= **
**
**
*
)(
)(
1),(
anan
ananbbaK
ba
ba
λ
λλ
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
+−
**
**
)(
)(
,
anan
anan
ba
ba
λ
λλλ  is a Stackelberg 
equilibrium. 
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On the other hand when (I) is the case and A is the first player 
ελ
λλλ
λπ −<⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+−
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⎞
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)()1(
)1(
1,
)()1(
)1(
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a
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bnnc  for 
)
)()1(
)1(
( **
*
ba
a
a nbbn
bnc λ
λε −+−
−< . Thus being the second player A can reduce the cost of 
manipulation and increase his profit.  
 
The cost to the society, when ( , )a bλ λ  is played, is: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−+−−+== bab
b
a
a
ba nn
nnncncelectionthesvvoterancPC 2
)1(
)1(),() in  ote  (),( λλλλαλλ
 Using this  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+−
−
*
*
**
*
1
2),(,
)()1(
)1(
b
bnncnc
nbbn
bnC b
ba
a λαλλ
λ
. When A is the second 
player, let ),( λλa  be played, where ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+−
−∈ λλ
λλ ,
)()1(
)1(
**
*
ba
a
a nbbn
bn
. Then 
0),(,
)()1(
)1(
2),(),( **
*
≠⇔⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+−
−<⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= ncnc
nbbn
bnCnncncC
ba
a
a
a
aa αλλ
λ
λ
λλαλλ . Let’s 
show that 0),(lim ≠
∞→
ncnc
n
α . We know that  and by using 
 we have that 
cn 2)1( 1 ≤− −α
cncnncnnc n 2)),(1()1)(,(1),(1 1 ≤−≤−−≤− −ααα cnnc 21),( −≥α . So 
021),(lim >−≥
∞→
cncn
n
α  since 2/1<c . Thus 0),(lim >
∞→
ncnc
n
α , and when A is the second 
player the cost of the selection decreases. 
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Similarly when (II) is the case and B starts the manipulation game 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
+−
**
**
)(
)(
,,,
anan
anannc
ba
ba
b λ
λλλπ  =  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
+−− **
**
)(
)(1
anan
ananc
ba
ba
b λ
λλ   < ε−1     when 
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λλε  , thus being the second player B can increase his profit. The 
cost to the society when B is the first player is 
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λλλλ , then the cost of this to the society is 
0),(
)(
)(
,
1
2),(),( **
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≠⇔⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
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⎞
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b
bb αλ
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λλαλλ . Thus 
when A is the first player social welfare increases. 
 
Proof of Lemma 11: As 0>ε , there exists  such that +ℵ∈l l/1>ε . For 
⎥⎦
⎥⎢⎣
⎢ += 1λ
MK l , by Lemma 7 there exists  such that for 0>Kc Kcc <∀  we have . 
Lemma 5 indicates that the number of votes for A- - and B- - have Poisson 
distributions with respective means  and . So, 
Km >*
aX bX
*mλ *)1( mλ−
*1
*
0
( )(   ) ( ) ( ) exp( )
!
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i
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=
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Notice that . So MKm l>> λλ * 1
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ε<≤<⇒<≥ ll /1)  ()  ( MturnoutvoterPMturnoutvoterP  for . So taking Kcc <∀
KcMc =),( ε  will complete the proof of our lemma. 
 
Proof of Proposition 9: If 
b
b
b n
n
)1(
)1)(1(*
λ
λλϕϕ −
−−−≤ ,  then as K increases with aϕ  
and decreases with bϕ  we have ))1()(1(),(min *],[],,[ ** bbbba nnKbbaa −+−=∈∈ ϕϕλ
λϕϕϕ
ϕϕϕϕϕϕ
 
1
))1(
)1(
)1)(1(
)(1(
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−+−
−−−−
≥
bb
b
b nn
n
n ϕλ
λλϕλ
λϕ  
 
If B chooses  the *bb ϕϕ = 012
11),( <−≤⇒≥ bbaK πϕϕ . Now 
 )1),(* >⇒< babb K ϕϕϕϕ ( bbb c ϕπ −=⇒ . So B does not manipulate whatever A 
chooses. Thus A always wins the election, so A does not manipulate either and this leads 
to a Nash and also a Stackelberg equilibrium. 
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If 
a
a
a n
n
λ
λλϕϕ )1()1(* −−−≤ ,  then by using the same observations as above, we get 
ϕλ
ϕϕλϕϕ
ϕϕϕϕϕϕ )1(
))1((
),(max
*
],[],,[ ** −
−+=
∈∈
aaa
ba
nnK
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1
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)1(
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−+−−−
≤ ϕλ
λϕλ
λλϕλ a
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nn
If A chooses  the *aa ϕϕ = 1),( ≤baK ϕϕ , so profit is at most  . Now  01)2/1( <− *aa ϕϕ <
1),( <⇒ baK ϕϕ  )( aaa c ϕπ −=⇒ . So A makes no manipulation and B always wins the 
election. So B does not manipulate either, and this leads a Nash and also a Stackelberg 
equilibrium. 
 
Let’s show that there is not any other Nash equilibrium. Assume not, and let 
),( ba ϕϕ  be a Nash equilibrium.   
 
⇒> 1),( baK ϕϕ A wins, and as bϕ  is the best response of B, ϕϕ =b   and 
0),( =bab ϕϕπ . If ϕϕ =a , then, as 
b
b
b n
n
)1(
)1)(1(*
λ
λλϕϕ −
−−−> , choosing some value 
closer to , B makes a positive profit. So *bϕ ϕϕ >a . But then, as K  is a continuous 
function, by decreasing aϕ  a bit )( ϕ>  A can increase his profit, which contradicts that 
),( ba ϕϕ  is a Nash equilibrium. 
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⇒< 1),( baK ϕϕ B wins and ϕϕ =a . Now ϕϕλ
λλϕϕ >⇒−−−> b
a
a
a n
n )1()1(* . By 
decreasing bϕ  a bit, B can increase his profit, which contradicts that ),( ba ϕϕ  is a Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
⇒= 1),( baK ϕϕ 1( ) , ( )2 2a a b bc cϕ ϕ
1≤ ≤ . If A chooses  such that aϕϕ >*
* 1( ) ( )
2a a a
c cϕ ϕ− < , then ),()(1)(
2
1),( ** baaaabaa cc ϕϕπϕϕϕϕπ =−<−= , 
contradicting that ),( ba ϕϕ  is a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof of Proposition 10: Note that in the given domain of  ,  we 
have
*
aϕ *bϕ
1),(min
],[],,[ **
<
∈∈ ba
K
bbaa
ϕϕ
ϕϕϕϕϕϕ
 and 1),(max
],[],,[ **
>
∈∈ ba
K
bbaa
ϕϕ
ϕϕϕϕϕϕ
. 
 
(i) 1* =K ⇒  whatever { }*, ii ϕϕϕ ∉  the first player { }bai ,∈  chooses the second 
player j  has the ability of making 1)),(| ( =jiwinsjP ϕϕ  by choosing an appropriate 
. So *jj ϕϕ ≠ j  wins the election. Choosing { }*, ii ϕϕϕ ∉  causes only a positive cost to i . 
If ϕϕ =i , then for 0>∀ε  there exists *( , )jx ϕ ϕ∈  such that 
1)),(),(| ( ji == xwinsjP ϕϕϕ  and ελ
λλϕ +−−< ))1(()(
jj
jji
jj n
n
cxc , so that 
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ελ
λλϕϕπ −−−−> ))1((1),(
jj
jji
jj n
n
cx  since  is a continuous function of . On the 
other hand, if i  chooses , then best response of 
)(xc j x
*
ii ϕϕ = j  is ϕ , which makes 
. So 0),(),( *ϕ i* == ϕπϕϕπ jii ϕ  dominates  and as a result i  chooses *iϕ ϕϕ =i . As the 
maximum value for jπ  is ))1((1
jj
jji
j n
n
c λ
λλϕ −−−  and j  can make 
ελ
λλϕπ −−−−> ))1((1
jj
jji
jj n
n
c  for any ε , there is an ε -equilibrium. For 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−∈∀ ))1((1,0
jj
jji
j n
n
c λ
λλϕε  , jπ 0> , so both of the candidates want to be the 
second player.  
 
(ii) Consider the case where 1* >K . If A is the second player whatever  
B chooses,  such that 
],[ *bb ϕϕϕ ∈
),[ ** aa ϕϕϕ ∈∃ 1),( * =baK ϕϕ  or ϕϕ =*a  and 1),( * >baK ϕϕ . For 
1),( >bK ϕϕ , knowing that he will lose the election B chooses ϕϕ =b . For first case, 
1),( * =baK ϕϕ , where A guarantees )(2
1),(),( ** aabaabaa c ϕϕϕπϕϕπ −=≥  and for 
)5.0,0(∈∀ε  such that ),( ** aaaa ϕϕϕ ∈∃ εϕϕ +< )()( *aaaaa cc , and 
εϕϕϕπϕϕϕϕ −−>⇒>⇒< )(1),(1),( ** aabaaabaaaaa cK  
),(),( * baabaaa ϕϕπϕϕπ >⇒ . On the other hand 0)(1),( >−= aaabaaa c ϕϕϕπ . So 
winning the election is better for A than a tie in election or loosing the election. Knowing 
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this fact B chooses ϕϕ =b . Then for 0>∀ε  ),)1()1(( *a
a
a
n
n ϕλ
λλϕϕε −−−∈∃  such that 
ελ
λλϕϕε +−−−< ))1()1(()(
a
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aa n
ncc , and 1),(
)1()1( >⇒−−−> ϕϕλ
λλϕϕ εε Kn
n
a
a  
ελ
λλϕϕϕϕπ εε −−−−−>−=⇒ ))1()1((1)(1),(
a
a
aaa n
ncc . Thus we have an ε -
equilibrium. 
 
Let A be the first player. Now  such that . So when A 
chooses 
),( ** aϕϕϕ ∈∃ 1),( ** =bK ϕϕ
),[ *ϕϕϕ ∈a ,   such that ),[ ** bb ϕϕϕ ∈∃ 1),( * =baK ϕϕ . So B guarantees 
)(
2
1),( ** bbbab c ϕϕϕπ −=  and )5.0,0(∈∀ε   such that ),( ** bbbb ϕϕϕ ∈∃
εϕϕ +< )()( *bbbbb cc , and 
),()(1)(1),(1),( *** babbbbbbbbabbbabbb ccK ϕϕπεϕϕϕϕπϕϕϕϕ >−−>−=⇒<⇒> . 
On the other hand 0)(1),( >−= bbbbbab c ϕϕϕπ . So winning the election is better for B 
than a tie in election or loosing the election. As a result if A chooses ),[ *ϕϕϕ ∈a  then 
0≤aπ . If A chooses *ϕϕ =a , then by choosing  B can make *bb ϕϕ = 1),( * =bK ϕϕ  and 
2
1)(
2
1),( ** −=−= bbbb c ϕϕϕπ  or by choosing ,),[ *bb ϕϕϕ ∈ )(),( * bbbb c ϕϕϕπ −= . Thus 
the best response of B is to choose ϕϕ =b  which maximizes bπ . Thus 
)(1),( ** ϕϕϕπ aa c−= . If  A chooses *ϕϕ >a  then as for , ],[ *bb ϕϕϕ ∈∀ 1),( >baK ϕϕ , 
so B chooses ϕϕ =b . Thus )(1),( aaaa c ϕϕϕπ −= . From all the possible strategies of A, 
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*ϕϕ =a  maximizes aπ . Now 
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 is a Stackelberg equilibrium. 
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λλϕλ
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⎞
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we get *** )()(),(),( ϕϕϕϕϕϕπϕϕπ εεε <⇒<⇒> aaaa cc . So A wants to be the second 
player to reduce the cost of manipulation, and this also decreases the probability of voting 
for the people who believe in A, thus increasing the social welfare as well. 
 
(iii) Now assume that 1* <K . If B is the second player, whatever  A 
chooses,  such that 
],[ *aa ϕϕϕ ∈
),[ ** bb ϕϕϕ ∈∃ 1),( * =baK ϕϕ  or ϕϕ =*b  and 1),( * <baK ϕϕ . For 
1),( <ϕϕ aK , knowing that he will lose the election, A chooses ϕϕ =a . For the first 
case, 1),( * =baK ϕϕ , B guarantees )(2
1),(),( ** bbbabbab c ϕϕϕπϕϕπ −=≥  and for 
)5.0,0(∈∀ε  such that ),( *bbbb ϕϕϕ ∈∃ εϕϕ +< )()( *bbbbb cc , and 
εϕϕϕπϕϕϕϕ −−>⇒<⇒< )(1),(1),( ** bbbbabbbabbb cK  ),(),( *babbbab ϕϕπϕϕπ >⇒ . 
On the other hand, 0)(1),( >−= bbbbbab c ϕϕϕπ . So winning the election is better for B 
than a tie in election or loosing the election. Knowing this fact A chooses ϕϕ =a . Then 
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ncc . Thus we have an ε -
equilibrium. 
 
Let B be the first player. Now  such that . So when B 
chooses 
),( ** bϕϕϕ ∈∃ 1),( ** =ϕϕ aK
),[ *ϕϕϕ ∈b ,   such that ),[ ** aa ϕϕϕ ∈∃ 1),( * =baK ϕϕ . A guarantees 
)(
2
1),( ** aabaa c ϕϕϕπ −=  and )5.0,0(∈∀ε   such that ),( ** aaaa ϕϕϕ ∈∃
εϕϕ +< )()( *aaaaa cc , and )(1),(1),(* aaabaaabaaaaa cK ϕϕϕπϕϕϕϕ −=⇒>⇒>  
),()(1 ** baaaac ϕϕπεϕ >−−> . On the other hand, 0)(1),( >−= aaabaaa c ϕϕϕπ . So 
winning the election is better for A than a tie in election or loosing the election. As a 
result, if B chooses ),[ *ϕϕϕ ∈b , then 0≤bπ . If B chooses *ϕϕ =b , then by choosing 
, A can make *aa ϕϕ = 1),( * =ϕϕ aK  and 2
1)(
2
1),( ** −=−= aaaa c ϕϕϕπ  or by choosing 
, )),[ *aa ϕϕϕ ∈ (),( * aaaa c ϕϕϕπ −= . Thus ϕϕ =a  and )(1),( ** ϕϕϕπ bb c−= . If  B 
chooses *ϕϕ >b , then for  ],[ *aa ϕϕϕ ∈∀ 1),( >baK ϕϕ . So ϕϕ =a  is the best for A. 
Thus )(1),( bbbb c ϕϕϕπ −= . From all the possible strategies of B, *ϕϕ =b  maximizes 
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 is a Stackelberg equilibrium. 
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we get *** )()(),(),( ϕϕϕϕϕϕπϕϕπ εεε <⇒<⇒> bbab cc . So B wants to be the second 
player to reduce the cost of manipulation. This also decreases the probability of voting 
for the people who believe in B, they increasing the social welfare as well. 
 
Proof of Proposition 11: The voters who believe λ   determine their strategy - 2aϕ  
and 2bϕ - such that: 
))1()(1())1((),( 2121 bbbbaaaa nnnnnc −+−=−+= ϕϕλϕϕλα  where 
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If 2 2{ , } (0,1a b )ϕ ϕ ⊂  then the society can prevent manipulation using totally mixed 
strategies and 
2
1) wins() wins( == BPAP  occurs as the result of the election. Now 
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So 10 2 << bϕ  when λ
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−
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1
1 bbn . 
 
Proof of Corollary 2: We get the desired result by using Proposition 11 together 
with the fact that ]),,(( λαλ nca ∈  and )),(1,[ ncb αλλ −∈ . 
 
Proof of Corollary 3: If lim ( , ) 0
n
c nα
→∞
=  then the society can prevent all 
manipulations only when 0== ba nn . But as { } )1,0(, ⊂ba nn , the society cannot prevent 
the manipulations { }ba λλ ,  satisfying λ
λa
an ≥  and λ
λ
−
−≥
1
1
 bbn . 
 
Proof of Proposition 12: The voters who believe iiiP λθλλ 2)A|( ==  vote with 
probability aaϕ  which satisfies:  
a
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aaaaaaa n
nnn −
−=⇔−+=
1
)1(
ϕϕϕϕϕϕ  , 
and the voters who believe )1(2)B|( iiiP λθλλ −==  vote with probability bbϕ  which 
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b
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1
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ϕϕϕϕϕϕ   
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If { } )1,0(, ⊂bbaa ϕϕ , then it is possible for the society to prevent  manipulation and get the 
same result in the election with the case without manipulation.  
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Proof of Corollary 4: We get the desired result by using Proposition 12 together 
with the fact that { } ],[, maxmin ϕϕϕϕ ⊂ba . When we take { } ],[, maxϕϕϕϕ ⊂ba , as the 
candidates are rational, then the society can prevent all  possible manipulations, when 
maxϕ
ϕ<an  and 
max
 ϕ
ϕ<bn , which follows from Proposition 12. 
 
Proof of Corollary 5: If lim 0
n
ϕ→∞ = , then the society can prevent manipulation only 
when . But as { } , the society cannot prevent the manipulations 0== ba nn )1,0(, ⊂ba nn
{ ba }θθ ,  satisfying 0=≥
a
an ϕ
ϕ  and 0 =≥
b
bn ϕ
ϕ . Now as the candidates can manipulate 
such that ],( maxϕϕϕ ∈a  or ],( maxϕϕϕ ∈b , they have the power to manipulate and win the 
election. 
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